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Abstract
Ethical discourse is typically inconclusive, and with good
reason.But this inconclusiveness is a distinct
disadvantage when it comes to helping publicly
accountable policy-makers in the health care system
provide an ethical justification for their decisions. It is
suggested that instead of ending with platitudinous
statements such as that a balance has to be struck
between the rival ethical considerations, empirical
research should be undertaken to elicit the quantitative
trade-oVs that the aVected general public would be
prepared to accept when striking this balance. In the
expected absence of any consensus, it is further suggested
that the views of the median person be taken as the best
approximation to the group view.Finally it is argued
that, far from this quantitative approach lacking
humanity by treating individuals as “mere statistics”, it
shows greater compassion than the proponents of those
approaches whose fellow feeling can only be stirred by
information pertaining to identified individuals.
(Journal of Medical Ethics 2001;27:251–255)
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Scene-setting
Ethical discourse is typically inconclusive. There
are good reasons why this should be so. The prem-
isses on which it is based are usually contestable.
There is usually more than one principle in play.No
single principle “trumps” all others. The situations
that are selected for analysis are complex ones
where the appropriate resolution of the ethical dif-
ficulties is not self-evident. The objective of the dis-
course is frequently claimed to be no more than
oVering clarification of, rather than recommending
any specific “solution” to, the issues involved. In
that context the most that can be said is “if you
attach more weight to principle X than to principle
Y, you should choose course of action A, but if you
attach more weight to principleY than to principle
X you should choose course of action B”. In the
field of medical ethics the situations and courses of
action that are presented and analysed are,
typically, carefully constructed scenarios involving
hypothetical people in hypothetical situations.
Sometimes additional information is provided, step
by step, to see how sensitive the initially recom-
mended course of action is to variations in the ini-
tial scenario.1 Whether and to what extent a course
of action should be recommended is typically tested
by pointing out not only its consequences in the
stated scenario, but also where adoption of the
same ethical principles would lead if applied more
widely. There seems to be a desire for some broader
consistency, and a general aversion to having ethical
principles become too context-specific. This im-
plies that there should be some partitioning of
decisions into distinct classes, within each of which
the same ethical principles should apply, but
between which diVerent sets of principles should
apply. There is one further strand in ethical
discourse which is worth noting, and that is the fre-
quent appeal to intuition, or to allegedly wide-
spread acceptability or support for the principles
that have been adduced, as a further justification for
according them some inherent merit (irrespective
of their consequences). Since there is usually some
ambivalence about some of the consequences (oth-
erwise there would be no ethical dilemma to
analyse), the bad aspects of these consequences are
labelled repugnant, or unfortunate, or tragic, or
some such term, and there the matter is left.2
Helping people to be clear in their own minds
about the ethical implications of their actions is not a
trivial pursuit, and in the context of publicly
accountable decision making it is especially impor-
tant, since the principal actors are expected to be
able to provide justification for their actions, and not
to behave arbitrarily or capriciously. But it is not suf-
ficient for them merely to list the various things they
claim to have taken into account. The citizenry are
entitled to know what weight they gave to each, so
that they can see what it was that proved decisive.
Otherwise, the same bland listing of relevant princi-
ples could provide justification for almost any
decision.
This is where economics can carry things
forward. Economics is about what people value and
how much they value diVerent things. An eYcient
economic system ensures that what people have to
sacrifice in order to get something they want is of
less value than the thing that they want (and that
this diVerence is as large as possible). The “thing”
they value may be a commodity, or a service, or a
scenic view, or an endangered species, or the
upholding of the rule of law, or the observance of
some ethical principle. Such “things” become of
interest to economists when in order to gain them
some other valuable thing has to be sacrificed, or, in
plainer terms, when they are costly. “Value” can of
course be interpreted in many diVerent ways. At its
crudest it becomes market value, and eYciency is
then about ensuring that the market value of a good
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or service exceeds the financial cost of providing it.
But it could equally well refer to the subjective
value, or the social value, of whatever items are
involved in the transaction. An eYcient system in
that context is one that ensures that the (subjective
or social) value gained is greater than its oppor-
tunity cost (ie what has to be sacrificed in order to
obtain it), where the latter is measured in compara-
ble units to the former.3 Thus the “opportunity
cost” of improving one person’s health might be
making the health of some other person worse.
When there is more than one criterion in play when
judging either the subjective or the social value of
an item, then a slightly diVerent “trade-oV”
problem presents itself, which is people’s willing-
ness to sacrifice performance on one criterion in
order to improve performance on some other crite-
rion. Technically this “trade-oV” is known in
economics as the marginal rate of substitution
between two goods, where normally the two
“goods” are commodities. But the concept is
equally relevant when the two “goods” are
outcomes such as the health of person A and the
health of person B, or when the two “goods” are
two ethical principles. The important additional
matter to be noted here is the marginal nature of
this concept. It is the rate at which, given a particu-
lar starting point, a small amount of the one good
will be exchanged for a small amount of the other
good, whilst leaving the overall level of wellbeing
constant. Note also the important caveat about the
starting point, because the marginal rate of substi-
tution will not generally be constant across all
choices, but vary according to the context.
Nevertheless it can in principle be derived from a
much more general “welfare function” which takes
into account these diVerent choice possibilities
within a larger “decision space”.4
Let us then explore the ways in which this
economic mode of discourse might complement
and extend the usual mode of ethical discourse. I
will first set up a hypothetical scenario, then work
my way through a (slightly caricatured) typical
ethical discourse related to it, and then continue
beyond that into the territory of economics, to see
where such an excursion might lead. I shall
conclude that it can greatly improve the clarity and
relevance of the ethical discourse.
The scenario
Suppose there exists a publicly accountable agency
charged with the two tasks of improving the health
of the community and reducing inequalities in
health within that community. Suppose further that
there is general agreement within that community
as to what health actually is (for simplicity let us
assume temporarily that it is years of life lived, or
life span). Suppose further still that the resource
constraints facing the agency when it is pursuing
these objectives are quite clear, and beyond its con-
trol. The fundamental ethical issue which the
agency has then to resolve is whether a year of life is
to be regarded as of equal value no matter who gets or
loses it, and, if not, how the diVerential value of a
year of life is to be determined.5 Note the phrase “is
to be regarded as” does not mean “is”, because we
are assuming that the agency itself has the task of
working out what a year of life to diVerent
individuals is to be valued at from the agency’s own
perspective, and this may be very diVerent (say) from
what each individual would be willing to pay (or
accept by way of financial compensation) to have
his or her own life lengthened or shortened when
viewed from the individual’s own perspective.
A possible ethical discourse
It is tempting to start by arguing that, on some
egalitarian principle or other, every year of life
enjoyed by every member of the community should
be accorded the same value. But this simple-
minded approach will not do in the present context,
because to adopt it would imply the total rejection
of one of the two objectives which the agency is
supposed to be pursuing, namely to reduce
inequalities in health. It is extremely unlikely that
the single-minded pursuit of the health-
maximisation objective will, quite coincidentally,
also minimise inequalities in health. It is far more
likely that a balance will have to be struck between
them, which means that extra years of life to the
more deprived (in terms of health) will have to be
regarded as of greater social value than extra years
of life to the more favoured (in terms of health).
The next stage of the discourse is therefore likely
to concern itself with rival ethical bases for
choosing how much weight to give to the reduction
of certain kinds of inequality versus other kinds of
inequality, and whose health should be sacrificed in
order that any particular inequality should be
reduced. Here the discourse is likely to focus on
whether any particular inequality is beyond any-
one’s control (either as regards its cause or its alle-
viation), and, if it is controllable, whether it is the
product of the voluntary (and well-informed)
behaviour of the individuals aVected, whether the
inequality is beneficial or damaging in some other
way to society, and how large it is. Generally it will
be possible to deploy ethical arguments both in
favour of and against any particular stance on any of
these issues, and, a fortiori, on the weight to be
attached to each when looking at the big picture.
The manner in which the protagonists then
attempt to convert others to their particular stand-
point is, typically, to point out the distasteful
consequences of the wider adoption of their oppo-
nents’ views. Thus those who think that we should
not regard smokers as blameworthy for their
shorter life span point to other behaviour which
adversely aVects health, and ask whether those
people should not be treated in the same way as
smokers, and, if they were, at the end of the day will
anyone be left blameless? On the other side, the
question posed is why should those who have
behaved responsibly with respect to their health be
penalised by having resources diverted away from
them to help the others, thereby reducing the very
life span they had striven to extend. Surely this is to
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deny people their just reward for virtuous behav-
iour, and that sends out the wrong signals to the
members of the society, thereby encouraging
antisocial behaviour of all kinds.
A similar set of conflicting views can be paraded
with respect to intergenerational equity. The
maximisation of life span is likely to concentrate
emergency treatment upon the young, because by
so doing the gains in life expectancy are much
greater. To counteract this tendency, the right of all
citizens to equal access to life-saving treatments is
adduced as a relevant principle to prevent any dis-
crimination on grounds of age.2 Against this it
might then be argued that the older members of the
community will already have had a “fair innings” in
terms of life span already enjoyed, so greater weight
should be given to helping younger people whose
lives are under threat than to helping older people
whose lives are under threat. Indeed the “fair
innings” argument might justify discriminating
against the old to an even greater extent than would
be justified by the health-maximisation objective.6
The persuasive powers of the various protagonists
are then typically deployed on a line of argument
where each probing question starts “how would
you like it if....”. How would you like it if, when you
are old, having paid all your life for health care to be
available when you need it, and never having
needed it until now, you are told that you are now
too old to be a high priority? Conversely, how
would you like it if it were your child that was
denied life-saving treatment because this old
person is getting higher priority because he or she
has paid more taxes into the system over his or her
lifetime than you have? And so it goes to the end of
its inconclusive path.
One possible way out of this dilemma is to put it
to a vote amongst the members of the community
whose welfare is at stake in one way or another. My
impression is that the public opinion poll solution is
distrusted by most ethicists, who usually cite capi-
tal punishment as an example of where public
opinion (which is reckoned to be in favour of capi-
tal punishment) is obviously wrong. Part of this
distrust concerns how issues are framed in such
polls, part of it is about how representative the
sampled population is, whether they mean what
they say, and whether they really understand the
problem and what is at stake. The favoured
solution7 tends to be to ensure that the voters are
thoroughly briefed (by neutral fair-minded experts
rather than by advocates of particular positions)
before expressing their opinions, and that they are
then required to produce an acceptable ethical jus-
tification for their choices (this acceptability being
determined by ........ whom?) Thus, in the capital
punishment case, I suppose that a person voting for
capital punishment because they believed it would
deter potential murderers would have their vote
disqualified, because (say) there is no evidence that
capital punishment does have a deterrent eVect on
murderers. But anyone who voted for capital
punishment because of a strong belief in retribution
(an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth ... a life for a
life) would have their vote accepted. A vote cannot
be disregarded just because you don’t agree with
the ethical principle on which it is based. If the pre-
dominant ethic in the community in which you live
is not acceptable to you, you can try to convince
people that you are right and they are wrong, but
until you have succeeded in that task you either put
up with it or move. You could try to generate a more
general discussion of the rival objectives of the
criminal justice system (retribution, deterrence,
rehabilitation, protection, etc) and ask people also
to consider the relative importance of ensuring that
no innocent person is ever unjustly punished, as
opposed to ensuring that no guilty person ever goes
unpunished, in the hope that this moves people in
your direction, but it might well not do so. Those
hell-bent on retribution might start dismantling the
rest of the apparatus to which you have so foolishly
drawn their attention!
A possible excursion into economics
It is precisely when matters get into an impasse that
cannot be resolved by logical argument that it is
useful to look behind the usual words that are used
in ethical discourse when the problem is handed
over to the reader. Characteristic phrases are “a
compromise has to be found”, “a balance has to be
struck”, “a judgment has to be made” or “it will
depend on how much weight is to be attached to
....”. All of these point to the presence of what I
earlier termed “a trade-oV problem”, and the first
task for any economic analyst would be to
formulate that problem in such a way that it
becomes susceptible to empirical analysis. But the
empirical analysis here goes beyond head counts
(though the “weight of opinion” may well include a
head count of some kind). It starts from the obser-
vation that it is not simply that some people are
100% for retribution and to hell with everything
else, while others are 100% for rehabilitation or
some other selected objective of the criminal justice
system.More often we would each give some weight
to more than one of these objectives, and perhaps to
all of them. The question is, how much weight, and
how context-specific is it?
One way into this is to present people with binary
choices and see which alternative they opt for, and
then, step by step, make their preferred option less
and less attractive until they switch. The stage at
which they switch can then be used to estimate the
quantitative weight they attach to the two rival
objectives. Let us go back to the earlier scenario of an
agency charged with the twin objectives of improving
the overall health of the population as much as pos-
sible, and of reducing inequalities in health within
that population (where “health” is still being
interpreted as “life span”). Let us assume that the
context is that there are two equally-sized groups in
the community, of which the better-oV group enjoys
a life expectancy at birth of 78 years, and the
worst-oV enjoys a life expectancy at birth of 73 years.
We could then oVer for consideration the following
alternative policies (which cost the same to imple-
ment):
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Option A: Increases the life expectancy of every-
body by two years.
Option B: Increases the life expectancy of the
worst-oV group by four years and leaves
the better-oV group unaVected.
Those who select A are obviously unconcerned
about inequality reduction. Those who select B are
concerned, but the interesting question is how con-
cerned are they? Suppose we came back to the latter
group and presented them with a second choice, in
which Option A is the same as before, but Option B
is rather less attractive, oVering only three extra
years to the worst-oV, and again nothing to the
better-oV. Some people will now switch to Option
A, but not all, so we can go on and reduce the gains
to the worst-oV under Option B to two years. Those
who still vote for B are telling us that they care so
much about inequalities in health that they would
be prepared to deny gains of two years to the
better-oV (which could be obtained at no extra
cost) in order to reduce the level of inequality from
five years to three years. And there may be some
who would go still further.8
What should we make of this diversity of opinion
if we were the policy-makers within the democrati-
cally accountable public agency which has to
choose between these options? There is a lot to be
said in favour of taking the median person as the
one to whom we should regard ourselves as
accountable, because in any majority voting system
that person will always be in the majority. But from
one decision to another it will not always be the
same person who is the median voter, and we can-
not submit every decision we have to make to some
kind of referendum, so we need to do something
rather more complex than the simple experiment
sketched out above in order to get some systematic
guidance as to where the (changing) median voter
is likely to stand in the complex territory in which
we are operating.
We could start by filling in some detail about the
characteristics of the groups that were designated
“better-oV” and “worst-oV” above. Suppose we had
said initially that they were (respectively) babies born
into households where the chief breadwinner was a
professional person, and babies born into house-
holds where the chief breadwinner was an unskilled
manual worker.We now change that, and in a subse-
quent experiment say that the better-oV group are
females, and the worst-oV group are males (the
initial diVerences in life expectancy at birth being
equally true in this case). Does this change the origi-
nal ratings in any way? We could then inquire why
the ratings had or had not changed. And we could go
on, in the same way, to explore ethnic diVerences,
geographical diVerences, intergenerational diVer-
ences, and so on, and in each case get some quanti-
tative indicator of how important these diVerent
inequalities in life expectancy at birth actually are to
the median voter. We could also find out whether
they are associated with the particular socio-
demographic or other characteristics of respondents
(for example the extent to which they might be self-
interested). Thus instead of limply concluding that a
balance has to be struck between potentially
conflicting objectives, we could go on to say where
the general public would like the balance to be
struck. It seems to me that evidence of this kind has
more to commend it than vague appeals to
“intuition” or alleged “wide acceptability”.
But there are other complications that also
deserve consideration. To regard “health” as simply
a matter of life span is clearly inadequate. The
(health-related) quality of people’s lives also
matters. We would not regard someone whose life
had been filled with pain and disability as having
been as healthy as someone who lived just as long
but without those disadvantages. So instead of
measuring people’s healthiness in terms of number
of years lived, we need to measure it in terms of
quality adjusted years of life, where the quality
adjustment in a public policy context also needs to
be that warranted by the views of the median
person. This too can be elicited by trade-oV experi-
ments of the general kind outlined earlier. Such an
approach will enable us to judge how much extra
weight we should give to a particular health gain
because it will go to a long term disabled person
compared with the weight it would attract if it went
to someone whose past health had been good. The
implication of this richer concept of health is that
instead of being concerned with inequalities in
people’s expected life span, the focus has shifted to
their expected quality adjusted life span.
This might well have some bearing on the two
experiments sketched out above, between social
classes on the one hand, and between males and
females on the other.4 The diVerences in life
expectancy are very similar in each case, but the
diVerences in quality adjusted life expectancy are
not. In the case of social class diVerences, the group
with the lowest life expectancy also has the worst
experience of pain and disability during their lives,
so that the diVerences in quality adjusted life expect-
ancy are much larger than the diVerences in life
expectancy itself. But in the case of males and
females, the group with the longest life expectancy
(the females) has a slightly worse experience of pain
and disability during their lifetime, so that the
diVerences in quality adjusted life expectancy are
slightly less than the diVerences in life expectancy
itself (though a marked diVerence in favour of
females still remains). So among the experiments
that need to be conducted are those designed to test
the sensitivity of these ratings to the manner in
which the inequality is measured and to its magni-
tude (since it seems likely that for those who are
averse to a particular kind of inequality, they will be
more averse the greater the inequality is).
Aversion to quantification
However, assessing aversion to inequality by trying
to find out what sacrifice in the overall level of
health people would accept in order to reduce it by
some specified amount, seems to elicit in some
people an aversion to quantification. One under-
standable reason for this is that some people do not
think in that way at all. At best they find it hard to
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grasp, and at worst they are totally alienated by it. It
is always a good strategy to maintain a sceptical
attitude to things you do not fully understand, and
to try to formulate questions to the cognoscenti
designed to allay or confirm your doubts or fears.
But aversion to quantification often goes further
than this, with outright rejection on the grounds
that it lacks humanity, and reflects a rigidly mecha-
nistic view of life, lacking sensitivity to the infinite
variety of human experience.
However they are reached, all decisions about pri-
orities, made on behalf of groups, are bound to “lack
sensitivity to the infinite variety of human experi-
ence” if by that is meant that they will not reflect the
choice that each and every individual would have
made had that individual had no one but himself to
think about. So that is not a consequence of quanti-
fication, but a consequence of having to make a sin-
gle decision on behalf of a heterogeneous group.
However, since this is inevitable, it has to be accepted
as inevitable, and the issue becomes how best to
minimise its adverse consequences. Ensuring the
fullest possible public accountability of the collective
decision makers is the process that has mostly been
relied upon for this purpose, allied to a majority vot-
ing system through which those aVected can make
their views count. But that is precisely how the
“trade-oV” ratios were generated, and on a more
sophisticated basis than anything that ordinary
voting systems can generate. These trade-oVs can be
made to generate “equity weights” which can be
promulgated by the public agency as reflecting its
policy, so that we know precisely where it stands on
each issue (and which it can use internally as a test of
its own consistency, which is important for purposes
of horizontal equity).8
But then we run into the objection about a “rigidly
mechanistic view of life”which this seems to entail. It
is, of course, no more “rigidly mechanistic” than the
rule of law, which enshrines sentencing principles
which are also quantitative, and which are based on
some weighing of the rival purposes of the criminal
justice system that were outlined earlier. But the
weight given to each of these principles changes
through time as “hard cases” come to light, and/or as
public opinion shifts, and/or as new circumstances
arise to which the existing rubric does not seem to
apply at all comfortably. The courts are publicly
accountable agencies establishing priorities in the
light of public policy, and then assessing allegedly
factual evidence to decide which side of a line a par-
ticular case falls. Presumably those who think that
quantification in setting health care priorities is
rigidly mechanistic think the same about sentencing
policy by the courts. But we live with it, because it
protects us from a greater source of injustice.
Finally we come to quantification as lacking
humanity. The more specific accusation here
appears to concern a lack of compassion generated
by treating people as “mere statistics”. I must con-
fess that it continues to bother me that people can
show enormous amount of concern for a single
identified suVerer, but fail to show much concern
when there are 100 anonymous people reported in
the same condition. This seems to me to reflect a
lack of humanity on the part of the unimaginative
people who cannot see that behind the “mere
statistics” there are (a lot of) real people, who do
have names and addresses and worried loved ones,
even though we don’t know them personally. It is
these unimaginative people, not the statisticians,
who are insensitive to the widespread experience of
struggling humanity. The statistical approach is an
important mechanism for trying to keep everyone’s
interests in balance. I think a major educational
eVort is required to inculcate a sense of “statistical
compassion” in people, so as to enlarge and extend
our concept of individual compassion.
Conclusion
Resort to numbers is not an abdication of moral
responsibility, nor an attempt to conceal the moral
issues involved. On the contrary, it is a means of
avoiding the impasse which much moral argument
reaches, when platitudinous generalisations about
striking a balance, or finding an acceptable compro-
mise, or weighing conflicting views one against
another, block further thought and progress. What
we need to do at that point is to seek some context-
specific guidance about how much weight should be
given to one principle versus another. In a publicly
accountable body making decisions on behalf of
groups of people within a community, there is much
to be gained from finding out what the members of
that community think those weights should be, since
staying close to them would appear to be a good jus-
tification for the policies pursued by such an agency.
It is here that the techniques of economic analysis
which have been developed to elicit the quantitative
trade-oVs that people are prepared to make when
called upon to sacrifice a little of one good thing in
order to get a little more of another good thing can
play a useful role in extending the scope of ethical
discourse. I commend it as part of the curriculum for
all medical ethicists.
AlanWilliams is quasi-retired Professor of Economics in
the Centre for Health Economics, University of York,
Heslington, York.
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